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which H u m e withdrew after 176o, and which he in 1753 described as "too frivolous"
to be included with the rest of his essays? And what of his deletion, after ten editions
(not three, as Livingston says), of all but three paragraphs of the first Enquiry discussion of the association of ideas, another textual segment on which the present interpretation depends? Whether we read H u m e narratively or conventionally these alterations in the corpus are too significant to be ignored or dismissed as merely
stylistic.
I raise these questions because I hope that Livingston will in due course respond
to them. He has provided us with an interpretive study of great scope and, as I
believe time will show, fecundity. But the interpretation is not finished; as it stands it
raises issues which Livingston himself must address if his readers are to be able to
build on his work. That this should be so is not surprising given the scope and
originality of this work, but based on this beginning I look forward to Livingston's
further explications of Hume's philosophy of common life.
DAVID FATE NORTON
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Alan White notes that Schelling is a philosopher who has become obscure, one no
longer included in our operative consciousness of the history of philosophy. And
even were he in our living memory, the metaphysical categories and constructions
Schelling pursued would seem questionable and of questionable pertinence to our
situation. But as Werner Marx reminds us, "the old questions present themselves
ever anew," and among them are certainly questions about the possibility of human
freedom and about the nature and meaning of history. Each of these concise studies
is devoted to removing the obscurity and to the portrayal of the intriguing fifty-year
career of the 'Last Metaphysician', who was ever challenged by the tension he experienced between the demands o f system and those o f freedom. And each of them
achieves its goal with remarkable clarity and philosophical vigor.
There are no deep differences in Marx's and White's interpretation of Schelling.
The starting point of his philosophy is an ideological commitment to defend human
freedom precisely by reconciling the natural and the moral worlds which Kant had
left sundered. But the transcendental construction of human experience as a totality
(the absolute, if you will) brings with it its own difficulties. When the philosopher
descends from the indeterminacy of the absolute to the determinate knowing self,
the intermediate structures of limitation and finitude take on the cast of law and
physical necessitation, and freedom disappears. Then there is the other problem of
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whether the philosopher can systematically deduce determinacy out of indeterminacy, the finite from the absolute. These two problems bedevil Schelling his whole
life long, the dialectic of freedom and necessity and the dialectic of the absolute and
the individual. White is correct in seeing Schelling's significance as negative. He tried,
and publically failed, to resurrect metaphysics first as ontology, then as theology, but
in doing so he introduced a new generation of thinkers, among them Kierkegaard
and Engels, to anthropological or existential themes. The very frankness of his anthropomorhic attempts to think God would seem to move his audience rather readily
into admitting that we really do have only ourselves to think about.
Marx chooses limited systematic topics in the three essays collected here, but by
confining his attention to the 18oo System of Transcendental Idealism and the 18o 9 Essay
on Human Freedom, he is able to underline Schelling's significant themes and problems.
It is interesting to note that White chooses to emphasize the same two works. His first
essay contrasts the explicitly teleological, indeed theological, foundations of the theory
of history enunciated in the 18oo system with the problematic, apparently unfounded
teleology of Habermas's vision of history as voiced in Erkenntnis und Interesse. Schelling
viewed history as the highest objectification of the will, the plane wherein its rationality
was no longer obscured by the arbitrary nature of individuals' acts and choices. Here
freedom is embodied in and supported by a mechanical order which Schelling calls "a
second and higher nature." Freedom and necessity conflict. Schelling postulates a
"highest synthesis" that binds together freedom and necessity and integrates the will of
individual agents into a world-historical teleological process. Marx notes that this synthesis is beyond the reach of individual consciousnesss, and that with this necessitarian
denial of the rationality of h u m a n agency, Schelling's whole system falls into contradiction, for the system was supposed to be founded on freedom and be nothing other
than the outworking of freedom's deeds. Alas, the contradiction is not confined to one
book; it vitiates the philosopher's whole career which seems to be a perpetually unsuccessful dialogue between Kant and Spinoza on human freedom. Schelling never sorted
out the terminology and defined what 'freedom' meant. Spontaneity, caprice, volitional indifference, self-determination, self-rule, Kant's autonomy, deliberation, ability
to resist desire, ability to change desirability--these are only some of the candidates.
Kantian freedom made into a system principle is unlikely to deliver the freedom moral
agents impute to themselves.
Marx devotes a second essay to a comparison between Schelling's 18oo System and
Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. His supposition is that the two works are parallel and
differ only in the way they seek to solve a commonly held vision of the task of
philosophy, enunciated by Hegel in 18ol as "d/e Aufhebung der Entzweiung"--the
resolution of dichotomies c o m m o n to ordinary consciousness and to traditional philosophy alike, oppositions between subjectivity and objectivity, between reason and
action, between intelligence and nature. Marx is peculiarly concerned to vindicate
Schelling's methodological principle, intellectual intuition. With the third essay Marx
returns to the freedom theme, noting that in the 18o 9 Essay on Human Freedom
Schelling attributes a sort of moral freedom to the absolute. Schelling pictures the
developed godhead as a personal God standing over against an independent world, a
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world which is a product of his freedom and self-development. Marx distinguishes
three moments in this moral freedom: (1) freedom as the ability to begin, productivity, or spontaneity (as in the 18oo system), (2) freedom as voluntary binding of
oneself to a necessity, self-determination or Spinozistic freedom, (3) the freedom
Kant ascribed to pure will, autonomy, or 'personality'.
White's account of Schelling differs from Marx's in that he offers a chronological
overview of the whole of Schelling's long career. He correctly sees that it is problems,
not solutions, that predominate in Schelling's thought, that the problem of freedom
is primary and abiding. He also appreciates how Schelling's early systems founder on
the the problem of the derivation of the finite. If on some hyperempirical level,
everything is deeply and marvelously one, how did we get here? That we in fact are
here is not a good answer. T h e limitations involved in individuality and finitude must
be systematically derived.
MICHAEL G. V A T E R
Marquette University
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Ever since the first World War there have been those who have accused Hegel of
fathering 'Prussian~sm'/ and, since the second World War, even National Socialism, ~
in spite of arguments to the contrary of such writers as Bernard Bosanquet, J o h n
Muirhead, and Sir Malcolm Knox. 3 He has also been accused of servility to the
Prussian authorities of his time. But, to say nothing of the earlier writers I have
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